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Abstract: Burma’s first well known welfare plan was entitled Pyidawtha or
Happy Land, and it was launched in 1952. In vernacular terms, the literal mean-
ing of Pyidawtha is ‘Prosperous Royal Country’. The government’s attempt to
sustain tradition and culture and to instil modern aspirations in its citizens
was reflected in its choice of the word Pyidawtha. The Plan failed and its impli-
cations still overshadow the development framework of Burma. This paper
discusses how the country’s major decisions, including whether or not to join
the Commonwealth, have been influenced by language; how the term and con-
cept of ‘development’ were conceived; how the Burmese translation was coined
to attract public support; and how the detailed planning was presented to the
masses by the government. The paper also discusses the concerns and anxie-
ties of the democratic government led by U Nu in introducing Burma’s first
major development plan to a war-torn and bitterly divided country, and why
it eventually failed.
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In May 2011, the new government of Burma convened a workshop entitled ‘Rural
Development and Poverty Alleviation’.2 Convened almost 50 years after Burma’s
first Development Conference, called Pyidawtha, the 2011 workshop shared some
of the ideologies of the Pyidawtha Plan under the government led by Nu. Social
welfare and equity have long been adopted by different Burmese governments as
their political goals, since the attainment of these goals could very well highlight
the role of the government as the champion of the poor. During the Nu era – from
1948 to 1962 – the administration’s image as the people’s government was very
important, as winning the hearts and minds of the rural poor meant winning the
then ongoing war against the communists. Such a rationale was reflected in
1 I would like to thank the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, the Netherlands
for funding this research project; Ian Brown, Emeritus Professor of History at SOAS, University
of London; Duncan McDuie-Ra, Associate Professor in Development Studies at the School of
Social Sciences, University of New South Wales; and Willem van Schendel, Professor in the
Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam for their feedback
and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper, and two anonymous reviewers who have pro-
vided me with valuable suggestions.
2 The Mirror, 23 May 2011.
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government ministers’ speeches and government publications in the 1950s, par-
ticularly in the vernacular circulations of their development plan.3
In this paper, I discuss historical events leading to the launch of the first major
welfare plan in Burma, and how Nu and his government presented this plan to the
country. The paper focuses on the use of language in the government campaign to
win over the masses with its development plan. With an analysis of the vernacular
version of the development plan Pyidawtha,4 my contention is that, to understand
the post-independence development programme of Burma, it is important to take
into account the Nu-led government’s profound concern that the public would be
won over by the communists if national planning were to be carried out largely
with foreign aid. The government avoided terms and campaigns that linked devel-
opment with imperialism, and the leaders – particularly Nu – presented the Plan
as a major revitalizing strategy to overcome the structural impediments left be-
hind by the British-imposed capitalist system and a weak economic sector.5 The
government chose the title and language of the Plan carefully so that it would
resonate with core Burmese values and aspirations. Such a process can be under-
stood in the context of the government’s profound fear and concern that there
might be a public backlash if the plan was viewed as a post-imperialist structure.6
This paper makes use of previously unavailable transcripts of the discussions
held by U Maung Maung, former Brigadier, Ambassador and author of From Sangha
to Laity: Nationalist Movements of Burma, 1920–1940 and Burmese Nationalist
Movements 1940–1948, and by former politicians and military leaders serving
during the 1950s, including U Kyaw Nyein, Minister of Home Affairs. It also has
recourse to transcripts of interviews by Burmese historians with leading Burmese
politicians in the 1980s; to newspaper reports; to government publications on the
speeches concerning the plans; and to debates on issues regarding foreign aid. As
a result of these sources, the paper departs from previous studies of the develop-
ment plans by analysing the language of the Pyidawtha Plan.
Existing scholarship on the development plans of Burma
Existing scholarship has often referred to the post-independence development of
Burma in the context of how Burma made concessions to and negotiations with
different donors. It has looked at what contributed to development failures and
how the civil war crippled governments. Ademola Adeleke has analysed how Burma
negotiated with and reconciled between the Economic Cooperation Administration
3 One such speech was that of Prime Minister U Nu, given at the launching ceremony of the Pyidawtha
Plan on 17 August 1952.
4 U Nu, (1955), ‘ ’ [Pyidawtha Plan], edited by Thein Han. Thein Han, 
 [Prime Minister Nu’s Union Goal], Burma Translation Society, Rangoon, pp
121–143.
5 Thein Han, ed (1957), ‘Premier reports to the people on law and order, national solidarity, social
welfare, national economy, foreign affairs’ (translation of speech delivered by the Honourable
Prime Minister U Nu in the Chamber of Deputies on 27 September 1957), p 29.
6 During his premiership, Nu also penned many articles and stories, including a play entitled
People Win Through, or , which portrayed the negative consequences of the civil war
and of communism, even though the Hollywood film version of the play painted Nu as a cham-
pion of democracy and a defender of communist aggression in the region. For more information,
see Michael W. Charney (2009), ‘Ludu Aung Than: Nu’s Burma and the Cold War’, in
Christopher Goscha, and Christian Ostermann, eds, Connecting Histories: Decolonization and
the Cold War in Southeast Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, pp 335–355.
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(ECA) of the USA and the Colombo Plan.7 Allen Fenichel and Gregg Huff have
focused on how the British administration neglected indigenous interests and how
the trade policies, or rather the lack of them, coupled with British immigration
policy, crippled the Burmese economy.8 Mya Maung has discussed how the con-
flicting ideologies of the Burmese government and development contributed to
the failure of development plans, and how cultural resistance to change might
explain the lack of development.9 Furnivall highlighted the vacuum left behind by
the foreign military and the collapse of social order under British rule, both of
which presented a mountain of challenges to the new independent government.10
Following similar lines of argument, Michael Adas posited that the British did not
occupy ‘undeveloped’ Burma, and that Burma’s problems could not be blamed on
local factors.11 And one of the architects of the Pyidawtha Plan, economic con-
sultant Louis Walinsky, has outlined the details of the plan and discussed its failures
in his comprehensive blueprint, Economic Development in Burma 1951–60.12
What is lacking in the existing literature, however, is any analysis of the process by
which the development plans were conceived and how their language was deployed,
or rather manipulated, by their architects, in order to win public votes and endorse-
ment. The words and language used in public speeches revealed the government’s
immediate concerns over the public reception of its plan and the threat perceived to
exist from the communists. While historical and political frameworks give the reader
an overview of the plans and the reasons for their failure in the broader context, an
analysis of the words and style of the language chosen by political leaders can provide
a snapshot of the immediate concerns that occupied leaders in the design and imple-
mentation of their development plans. While previous research and publications
focused on hard factors, such as the political and economic variables that underpin the
execution of the development plan, this paper instead places its emphasis on soft
factors such as the raison d’être of the development plan, its cultural relevance and the
attempts to manipulate its language on the part of the leaders.
The power of words, Burma’s post-independence woes and foreign aid
Controversies surrounding foreign aid originated around 1945, immediately after
the Second World War, during the time when the British came to realize that,
7 Ademola Adeleke (2003/04), ‘The strings of neutralism: Burma and the Colombo Plan’, Pacific
Affairs, Vol 76, No 4, pp 593–610.
8 Allen Fenichel and Gregg Huff (1975), ‘Colonialism and the economic system of an independent
Burma’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol 9, No 3, pp 321–335; Allen Fenichel and Gregg Huff (1971),
The Impact of Colonialism on Burmese Economic Development, Occasional Paper Series, No 7,
Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University, Montreal. See also Norman G. Owen
(1975), ‘Colonialism, development, and under-development in Burma’, Journal of Asian Studies,
Vol 25, No 1, pp 115–119.
9 Mya Maung (1964), ‘Cultural value and economic change in Burma’, Asian Survey, Vol 4, No 3,
pp 757–764. Robert Holmes discussed the Burmanization during the Socialist period. See Robert
A. Holmes (1967), ‘Burmese domestic policy: the politics of Burmanization’, Asian Survey, Vol
7, No 3, pp 188–197.
10 J.S. Furnivall (1949), ‘Twilight in Burma: independence and after’, Pacific Affairs, Vol 22, No 2,
pp 155–172. J.S. Furnivall (1949), ‘Twilight in Burma: reconquest and crisis’, Pacific Affairs,
Vol 22, No 1, pp 3–20.
11 Michael Adas (1972), ‘Imperialist rhetoric and modern historiography: the case of Lower Burma
before and after conquest’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol 3, No 2, pp 175–192.
12 Louis J. Walinsky (1962), Economic Development in Burma 1951–60, Twentieth Century Fund,
New York.
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sooner or later, Burma should be granted the right to self-determination, be it in
the form of total independence or as part of the Commonwealth of Nations. But
before Burma was granted independence on 4 January 1948, almost all the cabi-
net members were assassinated on 19 July 1947. Aung San’s first and last trip to
London to meet Attlee to discuss the terms and conditions of independence was
fraught with conflict both before and during the visit.
According to Ba Pe, who was the founding father of modern Burma’s first po-
litical organization – the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) – and of
Thuriya [The Sun] newspaper in Burma, and who served on the governor’s coun-
cil, Burma’s new young leaders first debated whether Burma should accept dominion
status or independence in 1946. In an interview with Burmese historians,13 Ba Pe
noted that he had advised the young leaders, including Aung San, during the fa-
mous Naythurein Conference in August 1946,14 that independence was a must,
but that Burma needed time to rebuild the country, and should therefore ask for
Dominion status first. He argued that only then could Burma request help from its
‘friends’ within the Commonwealth of Nations to rebuild the country.
The then leader of the Communist Party, Than Tun, opposed Dominion status,
however, and instead advocated a ‘clean break’ with the British.15 Ba Pe admitted
that Than Tun’s communists outnumbered senior politicians like him, who had
served in the previous cabinets. The senior politicians favoured Dominion status
and wanted Burma to remain in the Commonwealth. They consequently urged
Aung San to follow their advice.
When Aung San left Burma to meet Attlee in London in late 1946, Ba Pe did not
join the group in the beginning, but after receiving a telegram from the delegation
to join them, he left his ailing wife and travelled to London. According to Ba Pe,
he advised Aung San to use the term ‘the right of [sic] self-determination’ when
negotiating with Attlee for Burma’s status after the war. The Aung San–Attlee
Treaty was duly signed, laying down the conditions and steps for Burma’s right to
self-determination. At that point, there was no dialogue between the Burmese
delegation and the British administration regarding Burma’s future in terms of
whether Burma should join the Commonwealth of Nations or opt for total inde-
pendence.
In fact, Ba Pe revealed in his interview that Aung San considered his advice on
Dominion status and reflected his thoughts on the status in his speech at the Ran-
goon Town Hall made a few months before his assassination. Nu – who succeeded
Aung San – remained ambivalent, however, about Dominion status.16 Nu was
13 They were preparing to write Burma’s history for the Historical Commission in 1965.
14 This conference was the first of many public rallies to show the masses’ support for the Anti-
Fascist Peoples’ Freedom League (AFPFL) led by Aung San.
15 Interview with Ba Pe (transcripts) by Aung Than and Khin Maung Oo, 6 September 1961, p 44,
private collections of the International Institute of Social History (IISH), Amsterdam. These tran-
scripts formed part of Maung Maung’s papers deposited at IISH. Burmese Ambassador to Israel
and Australia, Maung Maung, collected interviews made by the Burmese Historical Commission,
and he himself conducted interviews and led discussions with other politicians and then leading
army officers including Kyaw Nyein and Brigadier Tin Oo, who later became one of the founding
fathers and the first president of the National League for Democracy (NLD). Maung Maung also
penned two books entitled From Sangha to Laity: Nationalist Movements of Burma, 1920–1940
(Manohar, New Delhi, 1980) and Burmese Nationalist Movements 1940–1948 (Kiscadale, Stir-
ling, 1989).
16 Ibid, p 57.
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concerned that, unless Burma was prepared to fight for total independence, the
communists would dominate parliament and Burma’s politics, and he believed
that total independence was the only means by which to ward off the communist
threat.17 Before he was assassinated, Aung San suggested to Nu that he should pay
a visit to Whitehall in the hope that he would change his views about independ-
ence when he saw the might of the British Army.18 Aung San requested Governor
Rance to send Nu an invitation to London, and Rance duly complied. Nu dis-
cussed with Attlee in London whether the name ‘British Commonwealth of Nations’
could be changed to ‘Free Commonwealth of Nations’ and, on learning that this
was impossible, Nu became determined that total independence was Burma’s only
option.
One leading woman politician of the time, Daw Mya Sein,19 was perhaps among
the very few people who could imagine Burma’s future in the Commonwealth of
Nations. In 1944, she wrote, ‘It was only a matter of time before the country
became a full member of the British Commonwealth of Nations’.20 She was opti-
mistic about Burma’s future after the war and, given the country’s natural resources
and traditionally strong social organizations, she believed that Burma could pros-
per quickly, and in her own words, ‘adjust to the tempo of modern life’.21
But British intelligence was less convinced. Reporting on Burma during the
Japanese Occupation, British intelligence wrote that, ‘Burmese nationalism is the
key to all Burmese political thought, and, as a general rule, it may be taken that
the Burman is primarily both anti-Japanese and anti-British’.22 Such an assess-
ment partly explained why Prime Minister Nu opted for total independence rather
than for joining the Commonwealth of Nations. Another important reason was
that the communists fiercely opposed any plan that would see Burma as part of
the British Empire, and the most profound fear of Burma’s cabinet was that the
country would fall into the hands of the communists if the government decided to
remain part of the Empire by choosing to accept Dominion status over total inde-
pendence. Ba Pe reflected such fears in his interview, and Nu made the decision to
break free of the Empire based on his calculations of the strength of his support
against the communists, and not on how Burma could best be rebuilt using the
resources the Commonwealth of Nations had to offer, as once envisioned by peo-
ple such as Daw Mya Sein – and briefly contemplated even by Aung San after his
short visit to London.
According to these previously undisclosed records, Burma’s decision to opt out
of the Commonwealth was based more on the name change than on patriotism
and the inflexibility of the nationalist leaders, as is commonly argued in the inde-
pendence narratives. This perhaps reflected the importance of the meaning of words
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, pp 46–57.
19 Daw Mya Sein obtained her BLitt from Oxford University and became the principal of the Bud-
dhist Girls School in Rangoon, Chairman of the Rangoon Education Board and Director of Women’s
Civil Defence. Highly educated and involved in politics, she was once considered for appoint-
ment to the Governor’s Council by Dorman Smith.
20 Mya Sein (1944), Burma: The Country: The People, Their History, Administration, Resources
and Trade Communications, Education and Religion, Relations with India, Nationalsim, The
Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 37.
21 Ibid.
22 Burma Intelligence Bureau (1943), Burma During the Japanese Occupation, Vol 1, Burma Intel-
ligence Bureau, Rangoon, p 17.
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to Burma’s leaders. Once the final goal of independence or the right to self-deter-
mination (the term Aung San first used when he met Attlee) was in sight, the
choice of which political status to adopt – be it Dominion status, total independ-
ence or becoming part of the Commonwealth – depended on which option would
leave the communists in the weakest position and hence mean the government
was better placed to deal with them. After years of struggle for independence, the
final decision seemed to have been influenced by how best to fend off an internal
enemy, rather than how to make best use of the resources that the colonial power
and the nations within the Commonwealth had to offer. Such a decision helps to
explain how national planning was later conceived and executed. Priorities were
set so that the enemy would benefit least from the plans, rather than the plans’
outcomes being managed most efficiently. And the language of the plans, such as
the Pyidawtha Plan, clearly reflected this rationale.
Immediately after independence in 1948, Burma was plagued by wars with dif-
ferent insurgent groups. In fact, late 1948 could be regarded as the climax of the
civil war, during which the Karen rebels seized major towns including Insein, a
suburb of Rangoon, for 108 days. The worst year of civil war followed in 1949.
Life expectancy in 1952 was a mere 34 years23 and, at the household level, there
was a net deficit of 2 rupees in the daily budget for food, according to reports by
the Burma Trade Union (BTU). The average labourer found himself in a much
worse situation after the war than before.24
Although Burma clearly needed help, Prime Minister Nu found himself walk-
ing a tightrope in terms of receiving overseas aid. Two years after independence,
the Burmese government fell behind in servicing British debts, and U Nu turned
to Britain and the Commonwealth for a loan in January 1950. As early as June
1949, Britain together with Australia, and then Ceylon, India and Pakistan, had
offered six million pounds sterling, mainly to back the Burmese currency. Nu
accepted the loan but decided not to use it.25
The government went to the USA in 1951, hoping that the first development aid
of US$8.01 million granted through the Economic Cooperation Administration
(ECA) would be extended when it expired in June 1952. But according to Section
511 B of the Mutual Security Act of the ECA, the Burmese government had to
agree to ‘eliminate causes of international tension’, a clause the Nu government
rejected. Burma then turned to the Commonwealth of Nations for aid.26 On 9
January 1952, the Nu government notified the British that it would participate in
the Colombo Plan. Following this announcement, the government replied to the
USA that it would not apply for more aid.
The ideology behind the Colombo Plan was that ‘poverty and underdevelop-
ment, and a huge population, made the non-communist states in the Asia-Pacific
region vulnerable to communist subversion; that economic development was the
most effective weapon against this menace; and that a significant improvement in
living standards in the region would render communism less attractive to the peo-
ple’.27 The main objective of the Colombo Plan was to protect countries from the
threat of communism. For the Nu government, public declaration of the govern-
23 Ibid, p 17.
24 Myo Htun Lynn (1961), Labour and Labour Movement in Burma, Department of Economics,
University of Rangoon, Rangoon, p 131.
25 Adeleke, supra note 7, at p 599.
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ment’s intention to accept the Colombo Plan was out of the question. Fighting an
internal enemy with foreign aid, as envisioned by the Colombo Plan, would not
only weaken the government position, but could also call into question the gov-
ernment foreign policy of neutralism, especially when the government needed to
work together with the People’s Republic of China in the war against Kuomintang
troops (KMT).
Perhaps the original goals of the Burma National Farmers’ Union (BNFU), a
political wing of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) govern-
ment, drafted in 1946, are able to provide an explanation of the tactics of, and
negotiations made by the Nu-led AFPFL when it sought foreign aid after the cli-
max of the civil war. Neutralism and non-alignment policies were used by the
Burmese government to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the communists, who
later sought support from China. But the government’s immediate concern was
not, as many Cold War scholars have argued, the communist blocs or the capital-
ists.28 Rather, it was the possible backlash from the mass of farmers and workers
upon which the Burmese communists built their strength. In its constitution, the
BNFU listed 21 agendas, the first of which was to fight ‘capitalist’ projects. By
adopting ideologies and slogans close to those of the communists, the AFPFL
strove to win the hearts and minds of the rural populations, whose support it needed
to win the physical battles and ideological wars against the communists.29
The Nu government’s change of decision to accept technical assistance from the
American firm Knappen Tippetts Abbett (KTA), as recommended by the US ECA,
therefore raised many questions. First, by August 1951, when the government signed
the contract with KTA, Kuomintang troops (KMT) led by General Li Mi had already
occupied the border town of Ming Sat and expanded their hold to Wa, Kokang and
Ming Lin along Burma–China borders.30 KMT later established its headquarters in
Ming Maw in the Wa region of north-east Burma. The Burma Army warned the KMT
in the first week of June 1950 and launched its first attacks a week later. In the
meantime, communists and some members of parliament were already linking the
KMT to the Americans, and the government’s attempt to seek help from a private
American firm was, in this context, very controversial. Indeed, such a strategy was
heavily criticized later by all camps, including the Socialists, and Nu was accused of
bringing back imperialism via his Pyidawtha Plan.31
26 Ibid, p 602.
27 The American Embassy, London to the Department of State: ‘Minutes on US–UK talks on South
Asia, 15 February 1951’, RG 59, Microfilm, C 0046 Reel 14, 890.00/2-1551, National Archives,
Washington, DC, as quoted in Adeleke, supra note 7, at p 595.
28 For more on Burma and the Cold War, see George Fujii, Tuong Vu and Wasana Wongsurawat, eds
(2009), Dynamics of the Cold War in Asia: Ideology, Identity, and Culture, Palgrave Macmillan,
New York; and for round-table debates on the book, website: http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/
roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XII-7.pdf (accessed 7 March 2011). Karl Hack and Geoff Wade
(2009), ‘The origins of the Southeast Asian Cold War’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol
40, No 3, pp 441–448.
29 For the government struggle against the communists, see Ba Ta La Sa (nd),  What
shall we do?, Rangoon.
30 Bo Mya Thway (1961),  Burma’s Enemy: White Chinese, Aung Myo Publishing,
Rangoon, pp 25–27.
31 Ibid, p 92. But the English version listed 12 schemes for 12 sectors categorized by industry,
namely: agriculture, forestry and fishing, transportation, telecommunications, power develop-
ment, minerals, industrial development, small-scale industries, health, education, housing and
social welfare.
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Foreign aid was seen as a direct threat to religion, custom and the state, accord-
ing to one leading newspaper, Bamakhit. The term ‘Pyidawtha’ was therefore
presented to the country in such a way that the concept and the very meaning
behind it could hide the tensions highlighted by Bamakhit. According to the gov-
ernment, the plan or concept of Pyidawtha was not an emulation of, or a submission
to, foreign ideologies and hegemony. Instead, it was the Burmanized develop-
ment plan based on the Burmese vision and understanding of development.
The editor of The Nation newspaper wrote the following, which highlighted the
controversies surrounding the planning for development, and the challenges that
the central government faced in bringing together a development plan:
‘Burma is a country that is experimenting with Socialism but is not going to
turn Communist overnight, a country that is on the frontier of the Iron Curtain,
and lives in peace with its neighbours, but is not willing to surrender its new-
found independence to any foreign power; a small country, very young, very
inexperienced and, therefore, sometimes over-sensitive.’32
Burma struggled to defend its new, post-independence foreign policies, which are
generally understood as non-alignment and neutralism. The new country’s sensi-
bility could be understood in the context of its strong desire and attempts to delink
from imperialism and to decide its own fate independently, free from any foreign
hegemony.
The Pyidawtha Plan
The Pyidawtha Conference was held from 7 to 17 August 1952, during which
time the government laid down different steps under the Plan and introduced the
whole Plan to the country. The Plan comprised 10 grand schemes covering (1)
transfer of power to regional governments, (2) health, (3) education, (4) economy,
(5) nationalization of arable lands, (6) transportation, (7) sufficiency (welfare),
(8) democratic local councils, (9) development in frontier and non-developed ar-
eas, and (10) rebuilding.33 During the conference, Nu highlighted the fact that the
administrative organs the government had inherited from the British were in need
of repair.34 Nu’s famous pledge to the country about the Plan was that it would
bring every citizen of Burma ‘a brick house, a car and 800 kyats in salary’.
There are two versions, or rather, two different forms of presentation of the
Pyidawtha Plan to the country. The vernacular form was in fact a compilation of
speeches made by U Nu when he introduced the plan to the country during the
Pyidawtha Conference in August 1951. Librarian, poet and writer, Zaw Gyi, also
known as Thein Han, edited the book of speeches, and it was published in Bur-
mese in Rangoon by the Translation Society, though no date of publication was
mentioned in the book.35 The English version was published by Hazell, Watson
32 The Nation, 27 November 1953, as quoted in ILO (1954), Expanded Programme of Technical
Assistance. Report to the Government of the Union of Burma on Labour Administration and
Labour Inspection (R6), ILO, Geneva.
33 Thein Han (1955),  [Prime Minister Nu’s Union Goal], Burma Trans-
lation Society, Rangoon, p 120.
34 Ibid, p 119.
35 The book included 12 speeches made by U Nu between August 1952 and December 1955, and
one could assume that the book was published some time in 1956.
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and Viney Ltd in London in 1954, and explained different sectors of the develop-
ment programme in terms of background, objectives, and the Plan in detail, using
graphs, figures and photographs. While the vernacular version was seemingly
aimed at rallying the masses behind the Plan, the English version provided a sum-
mary of technical details for the educated and informed elites. The former was for
the heart and the latter was for the head.
‘Pyidawtha’ is often translated as ‘welfare’ and the Pyidawtha Plan as the ‘Wel-
fare Plan’.36 There are three syllables or parts to the word Pyidawtha – Pyi, Daw
and Tha – and each has a meaning. Pyi means country, Daw is a royal suffix and
Tha means pleasant, delighted or to prosper. In terms of syntax, Pyidawtha is both
a noun and a verb. As a noun, it means a pleasant and majestic country, and as a
verb, it means the majestic country will prosper. The word Pyidawtha is a unique
Burmanization of the modern word ‘development’, which is translated as 
or phún-phyò-yè. An accomplished writer and playwright who once told Thakin
Soe that he could become Burma’s Maxim Gorky if Soe became Lenin,37 Nu seemed
to have invented the very first all-encompassing Burmese term for development –
Pyidawtha. Modern references to the country such as  or naing-ngan were also
avoided; instead,  or pyi was used, connecting present-day Burma to the times
of kings and queens, during which kingdoms were known as Pagan Pyi, Pinya
Pyi and Ava Pyi.38 Ideas of sustaining tradition and culture, but also emphasizing
hope with modern development, were all crystallized in the word Pyidawtha.
The use of the word not only signalled the Prime Minister’s desire to embrace
tradition and promise development to the country, but it also reflected the newfound
confidence of the government, which had just won the elections in 1950, and
which had just reoccupied the previously ‘multi-colour’ insurgent-held areas in
1949 and 1950. The Pyidawtha Plan can be referred to as the second major na-
tional planning scheme of the Nu government, the first set of plans being the
Sorrento Villa Plan, named after the building in Rangoon in which it was an-
nounced. The state’s control of the economy was the linchpin of the 1947 Sorrento
Villa Plan, and the Land Nationalization Act was one of the pieces of legislation
enacted under it. But most of the objectives of the plan were not fulfilled, and
many tasks remained on paper due to the outbreak of the civil war.39 Compared
with the name Sorrento Villa, ‘Pyidawtha’ reflected a fresh, confident start by the
government to rebuild the country.
Without question, the term ‘Pyidawtha’ captured the imagination of the masses.
A Rangoon bus advertisement campaign claimed ‘Pyidawtha’ as the destination;
children in the streets sang Pyidawtha songs; at Pyidawtha coffee bars, one could
buy a cup of ‘Pyidawtha coffee’ or a glass of cold ‘Pyidawtha milk’.40 Pyidawtha
was synonymous with everything modern.
When Nu opened the Pyidawtha Conference in August 1952, he outlined its
four goals: (a) to explain new projects to the representatives of the people; (b) to
ask for advice from the representatives; (c) to promote the projects through the
36 Mya Maung, supra note 9.
37 Maung Soe Maung (nd),  [Prime Minister U Nu], Thamaseiqta, Rangoon, p 57.
38 The new capital of Burma, Naypyidaw, means ‘Royal Abode’, or literally, ‘live’, ‘country’ and
‘royal’ or ‘majestic’.
39 Mya Maung, supra note 9, at pp 1182–1183.
40 Maung Maung (1953), ‘Pyidawtha comes to Burma’, Far Eastern Survey, Vol 22, No 9, pp 117–
119, at p 119.
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representatives; and (d) to seek approval from the public. There were certain key-
words that the Prime Minister repeatedly used during his opening speech:
 or ‘to create new lives’; or ‘to promote all-round devel-
opment for the five pillars, that is, physique, intellect, economy, morality, and
society’; and  or ‘to improve morality’. These words appeared repeat-
edly throughout his speech.
U Nu’s Pyidawtha opening speech could be understood as the Prime Minister’s
first public meeting with the masses to explain why independence alone had failed
to bring what the people expected, and what was expected of the citizens to build
a new Pyidaungsu or Union. The Prime Minister pointed out the dangers of not
uniting or working hard or having loose morals, and he begged the people to
understand and trust in the government programmes, and to be patient with the
slow progress they were making. He defended the fact that little progress had
been made in nation-building after five years of independence, and directly
addressed his critics who had coined the term or ‘fake-gold
independence’.
His speech also contained numerous metaphors for the country, people and events.
He used the term  or ‘juvenile monkey’ to refer to a country that could
not aim towards higher goals because of armed insurgencies and robberies, and
the country that was frozen in a state of transition, unable to attain its potential or
maturity a few years after independence. Furthermore, he pledged to work hard so
that the citizens could be as healthy and strong as the legendary heroes Kyan-siq-
thà , Nyaung-ù-phì , Nga-htwe-yù , Nga-loun`-la-pheh ,
Ananda-Thuriya , Pauq-hla  and Tha-main-ba-yan` , who could
fight tigers, crocodiles and gorillas single-handedly.41 His speech abounded with
examples from Burmese legends and proverbs, and could be understood more as
a prime ministerial attempt to re-enact ‘history’ than as a laying out of detailed
plans for development. Perhaps such an attempt reflected how the Prime Minister
chose the language and metaphors that would win the approval of the rural masses,
at whom the Pyidawtha Plan was targeted. He was perhaps convinced that only
words rooted in local culture and Buddhism could help his rural masses to under-
stand the Plan better and to visualize its goals more clearly – hence his oft-cited
references to the importance of moral characters and to creating new lives built
upon moral foundations.
But in its English version, which seemed to be aimed at planners and elites, the
use of overtly Burmanized words such as ‘to develop the five pillars’, ‘to improve
morality’ and references to Burmese proverbs were omitted. Instead, in the offi-
cial publication of Pyidawtha, the government highlighted the words chosen by
technical advisers such as Louis Walinsky. Phrases such as ‘Burma can remain
economically independent and self-supporting, but can never become economi-
cally self-sufficient’42 were chosen over ‘poverty brought corrupt morality’.43 The
English version of the Pyidawtha Plan44 was in fact closer to the original copy of
41 Thein Han, supra note 5.
42 Economic and Social Board (Government of the Union of Burma) (1954), Pyidawtha: The New
Burma, A Report from the Government to the People of the Union of Burma on our Long-term
Programme for Economic and Social Development, Hazell, Watson and Viney, London.
43 Thein Han, supra note 5, at p 22.
44 Ibid.
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the Comprehensive Report on the Economic and Engineering Development of Burma
by the KTA submitted to U Win, Minister for National Planning and Religious
Affairs, on 7 August 1953.
That the government presented the Pyidawtha Plan in two versions at two dif-
ferent times, and that they were completely different from each other in terms of
the choice of language and style, reflected the fact that the government was con-
cerned that the drafting of the Pyidawtha Plan, as aided by the ECA, could have
given political leverage to the communists if it was understood as a blueprint to
invite further colonizers, as Bamakhit argued.45 The government’s decision to present
the Pyidawtha Plan differently to two different audiences – the rural population
and the urban elites – was influenced by its acute awareness of the imminent
danger posed by the communists who commanded a strong influence over the
former. Words capturing the masses’ understanding of physical and spiritual de-
velopment reflecting Buddhist concepts, which could attract not only laypeople
but also members of the Sangha community, were chosen by U Nu in his speeches
and in writing.
In his speeches, the Prime Minister often assumed the tone of a father encour-
aging his children to turn their backs on pleasure and look to work. He also blamed
the British government for neglecting the real needs of Burma, especially the
provision of modern education, the improvement of healthcare and sharing the
economic benefits with the peoples of Burma. The essence of his message was
that Burma did not recover because of systematic destruction by the British. Ac-
cording to him, civil war only postponed the rebuilding programmes, but the British
were responsible for the difficult start that the nation had experienced.46 He re-
peatedly emphasized that independence was not the goal, but a means towards the
goal, and the goal as he revealed was the Pyidawtha or the Prosperous, Majestic
Country, and the means or pathway towards it must be guided by moral values.
Mrs Ba Maung Chain, once Minister of the Karen State and representative of
the Burmese Christians, accused the Burmese government, however, of testing
‘Russian’-style economic plans that contributed to the failure of government pro-
grammes.47 She referred in particular to the nationalization of land and businesses
outlined in the Sorrento Villa Plans, some of which were also repeated in the
Pyidawtha Plan. She also suggested that the government should seek foreign aid
as long as the country did not sacrifice its ideologies to the donor countries. Women
politicians and leaders such as Mrs Ba Maung Chain and Daw Mya Sein clearly
saw the need to seek aid from outside, pointing to the shortage of personnel and
skills necessary to carry out the nation-building process. Their male counterparts,
on the other hand, emphasized the importance of self-help and ensured that the
public understood the development programme as a set of ‘Burmanized’ plans,
independent of foreign influences.
But the Prime Minister’s decision to present the Pyidawtha Plan as an indig-
enous plan to address the real needs of the country, and his rallying cry to help
implement it, seemed to have been justified, as it was well received by the public.
Hugh Tinker wrote:
45 Bamakhit, 13 July 1955.
46 The Burmese government from 1988 to 2010 often echoed such reasoning. See Aung San Suu
Kyi’s Reith Lectures, 2011.
47 Thuriya, 2 November 1950.
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‘An appeal has been directed to the strong Burmese tradition of charity (ahlu)
which, in the past, has been applied largely to religious ends: in particular it has
been the aspiration of every well-disposed and wealthy Burman to be a paya-
taga (temple builder). Now, it is hoped to persuade the people that merit can be
acquired through devoting their resources and their energies to the building of
works of social benefit. There is little doubt that Pyidawtha in this form has
attracted the popular imagination, and in promoting the cause none has been so
enthusiastic, none has set such an example, as U Nu.’48
Pyidawtha, which was also translated as ‘Happy Land’, was fraught with contro-
versies from its conception. In its English version, the Plan not only laid down
detailed strategies for rebuilding the country, but it also highlighted the fact that
Burma, with this Plan, could remain at the vanguard of the non-alignment move-
ment, and it adopted a position of neutrality in Asian political theatres. Burma
needed foreign aid, and it sought help from the USA and UN agencies. Yet the
country had just emerged from civil war,49 and leaders were deeply concerned that
reliance on foreign aid would push the masses into the arms of the communists,
who constantly portrayed the government as ‘stooges of imperialism’. The gov-
ernment’s difficult position was reflected in the diplomatic and political strategies
it adopted to secure help from both the USA and the Commonwealth of Nations
so as to neutralize their positions, along with the government’s attempt to portray
its development plan as self-help, independent of any foreign influence so as to
hide foreign aid from the eyes of the public. Words were carefully chosen to present
the Pyidawtha Plan to the country as a blueprint for self-help, a Burmanized de-
velopment plan which would meet the needs of the people and which would be
implemented by the people themselves. According to one of Nu’s ministers, the
goal of his government’s Plan was to give life to the ‘People’s Democratic
Machine’.50
U Nu’s Pyidawtha Plan could be viewed in the context of the government striv-
ing to maintain neutrality, substituting the formal nationalist strategy once described
by British Intelligence as ‘anti-British, anti-Japanese’, with an almost ‘pro-Brit-
ish, pro-American’ tactic to represent Burma as a strictly neutral nation. U Nu
also attempted to change all the former notions about Burma and its nationalist
leaders. Before he declared the Pyidawtha Plan to the nation, U Nu announced on
3 May 1952 that he was to be known as U Nu instead of Thakin Nu as he had
previously been known.51 The year 1952 seems to have been a turning point for
the Burmese government. Not only was it the year in which the Pyidawtha Plan
was launched, but it was also the year that the leaders of the government made a
departure from the past, perhaps also shedding nationalist titles and presenting
themselves as neutral, starting with the name ‘U’ instead of ‘Thakin’. A new chapter
48 Hugh Tinker (1957), ‘Nu, the serene statesman’, Pacific Affairs, Vol 30, No 2, pp 120–137, at p
129.
49 It was reported that the civil war claimed the lives of 22,077 civilians, 5,693 of soldiers, armed
personnel and government servants, and it is estimated that the war cost Burma 47.3 billion Kyats
in 1955. ‘Premier reports to the people on law and order, national solidarity, social welfare, na-
tional economy, foreign affairs’ (translation of speech delivered by the Honourable Prime Minister
U Nu in the Chamber of Deputies on 27 September 1957).
50 Ba Swe, (1951),  Our Revolution, Pyithu Sarpay, Rangoon, p 18.
51 Bamakhit, 13 March 1952, p 1.
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for Burma, the Burma that was now ready to receive not only foreign technical
assistance but also foreign aid, over which communist and socialist camps vehe-
mently fought, began. Nationalist Burma was no more; internationalist Burma
was to be ushered in and the Happy Land was the door to the new Burma.52 But
the terms ‘aid’ and ‘foreign aid’ were well hidden from the public sphere and from
public debate.
Maung Maung, one of the advisers to the Burma Socialist Programme Party,53
observed that socialists within the Nu government supported the Pyidawtha Plan,
as it was ideologically neutral and above politics or party.54 One of the socialist
leaders, Ba Swe, who was also the Defence Minister in 1952, viewed the Pyidawtha
Plan as a step towards ‘their revolution’. The ideologies that lay behind Pyidawtha,
which placed a strong emphasis on social welfare, were based on Marxism but
adapted to meet local needs and circumstances.55 Ba Swe also wrote that the gov-
ernment’s new programmes were designed to transfer power back to the people,
quoting the 1947 constitution, which included a clause that ‘Power must come
from the People’.56 Maung Maung also described the Plan as self-help, which was
clearly misleading, as the recommendations from the Plan were to be implemented
with aid provided by the American government as part of the Colombo Plan. At
the end of the first year of the Pyidawtha Plan, it was reported that it had been
80% successful, though no explanation was given as to how such success was
measured. Townships in the country were given funds to implement their own
plans, one of which included assisting peasants. Maung Maung highlighted the
fact that ‘more reservoirs have been dug, more roads opened and repaired, more
bridges built, and more primary-school accommodation added than could have
been provided by years of government activity in the sphere of blueprints and
bureaucracy’.57 Maung Maung also pointed out that Pyidawtha’s practical solu-
tions to the war-torn Burma were aimed at the fair distribution of welfare services.
While the leaders were praising the indigenous approach to national planning, it
was obvious that they were continuing to seek support from foreign experts, as
they visited the country and often stayed for months to gather facts and prepare
reports for the Burmese government. But Maung Maung’s paper did not mention
the roles of such experts, and perhaps he wanted to draw attention to Burma’s
own self-help approach to its problems, being careful not to draw attention to
foreign intervention in the nation’s (re)building.
As Maung Maung further wrote, ‘Pyidawtha aspires not merely to develop Burma
in material ways, but also to create the “new man” that is, a responsible citizen
who will participate actively and constructively in government, an intelligent,
public-spirited individual possessing a reasonable share of modern education’.58
Maung Maung contradicted himself in the same article, however: after praising
52 For more literature on new nations as a product of nationalist movements, see David C. Potter
(1973), ‘Manpower shortage and the end of colonialism: the case of the Indian Civil Service’,
Modern Asian Studies, Vol 7, No 1, pp 47–73.
53 He later became the President, though only for 18 days, after the 1988 uprisings. A former PhD
student from the University of Leiden, he was the architect behind the 1974 constitution, and was
a trusted member of the BSPP government led by General Ne Win.
54 Maung Maung, supra note 40, at p 117.
55 Ibid.
56 Ba Swe, (1951)  Our Revolution, Pyithu Sarpay, Rangoon, p 17.
57 Maung Maung, supra note 40, at p 117.
58 Ibid, p 119
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Pyidawtha for its self-help model, he also commented that Pyidawtha was to lean
‘rather heavily’ on the USA.
Despite the government’s eulogies and high expectations, the Pyidawtha Plan
ultimately failed. Projects were delayed and subject to overspending, and logis-
tics failed woefully. Some examples included cement powder destroyed in the
rain and newly built textile factories that could not use the local cotton, since it
was too short. Similar stories began to appear in local newspapers in the mid-
1950s. Louis Walinsky lists further factors to explain the fall of U Nu, among
them a lack of technical and executive ability among leaders, including U Nu and
civil servants; corruption; the government’s inability to remove ‘the bureaucratic
shackles inherited from the colonial administration’; failures in democracy and
the parliamentary system; internal factions within the AFPFL; and the govern-
ment’s inability to end the civil war.59 These same factors were also attributable to
the fall of the Pyidawtha Plan. 60
 In addition, Burmese rice exported to Korea during the Korean War helped
bring much needed revenue to the country,61 but it also created fundamental prob-
lems in the drafting of the development plan. While the actual amount exported
did not increase, the price of rice decreased from £60 per ton from 1952/53 to £32
by 1957/58, a staggering 46%.62 One of the major assumptions made in the Plan
was that it should be supported by the export revenue from rice. The irony was
that although the Rice Marketing Board, which was later known as the State Ag-
ricultural Marketing Board (SAMB), became a ‘powerful instrument of national
economic development’,63 it had no control over the world rice market and the
decline in price became one of the reasons for the shortfall in development fund-
ing.
When the Plan collapsed, ‘Pyidawtha’ became a catchphrase for all things that
had failed at the hands of the government. For example, couples practising ball-
room dancing and women wearing sheer blouses were referred to as ‘Pyidawtha’.
Pyidawtha in this context became an oxymoron. Its original meaning highlighted
modernity as a desirable lifestyle, yet when the Plan collapsed, Pyidawtha be-
came synonymous with what society considered to be social ills, such as
male–female intimacy, indulgence and immodesty.
Conclusion
Nu was aware of some of the problems that Walinsky lists, and his opening speech
during the Pyidawtha Conference highlighted the long-term problems of Burma.
Moreover, he also requested that the public should be patient in the rebuilding of
the country. But the very language he and his ministers, such as Ba Swe and
advisers such as Maung Maung, used in public belied the magnitude of the problems
59 Walinsky thought that because they had been comrades during the independence struggle, the
government was too lenient on the insurgents. Walinsky, supra note 12, at p 385.
60 Louis J. Walinsky (1965–66), ‘The rise and fall of U Nu’, Pacific Affairs, Vol 38, No 3/4, pp 269–
281.
61 Sean Turnell (2009), Fiery Dragons: Banks, Moneylenders and Microfinance in Burma, NIAS,
Copenhagen, p 172.
62 Walinsky, supra note 12, at pp 371–373.
63 Hla Myint, Rector, University of Rangoon, to Louis Walinsky, Washington, DC, 4 February 1960:
3/20 in Louis Walinsky Papers, Cornell University Library, Collection Number 4874 (courtesy of
Professor Ian Brown).
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.
they faced in implementing the Pyidawtha Plan. Their language painted the
Pyidawtha Plan as a sure way out of poverty, and the road to the Happy Land. In
this paper, I show how Nu and his government chose particular words and exam-
ples to distinguish themselves from the communists and to present the government
as independent of any foreign hegemonies and instead as being reliant on self-
help programmes to rebuild the country. Yet such a careful selection of words and
the style of language in the end still failed to connect the government with the
public, with the innovative term ‘Pyidawtha’ becoming an oxymoron following
the failure of its projects.
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